





One of our most fundamental notions of morality is that in so far as objects have moral properties, they have non-moral properties that make them have moral properties. Similarly, objects have moral properties in virtue of or because of having non-moral properties, and moral properties depend on non-moral properties. In ethics it has generally been assumed that this relation can be accounted for by the supervenience of moral properties on non-moral properties. However, this assumption is put into doubt by an influential view in contemporary ethics: particularism. Thus, one of particularism’s most important implications is thought to be that supervenience is incapable of accounting for the notion that non-moral properties make objects have moral properties. At least, this is what Jonathan Dancy, the leading proponent of particularism, argues in his recent book, Ethics Without Principles, and elsewhere.
	In the present paper, I defend supervenience against this challenge. That is, I argue that particularism does not threaten the ability of supervenience to account for the notion that non-moral properties make objects have moral properties. While doing so, I hope to contribute to our understanding of what is involved in this notion. In the next section, I consider a general argument put forward by Dancy against supervenience and criticise his alternative, resultance. In section 3, I develop a version of supervenience that I call Specific Moral Supervenience, SMS, and which I think avoids Dancy’s argument. There are basically two conceptions of particularism: what is known as ‘holism’ and the contention that there are no true moral principles. In section 4, I argue that the view that SMS provides a basis for an account of the notion that non-moral properties make objects have moral properties is compatible with the pertinent version of holism. However, in section 5 we see that SMS is incompatible with the view that there are no true moral principles. Particularists find support for this view in the distinction between non-moral properties that make objects have moral properties and so-called enablers. On Dancy’s conception of this distinction, it follows that SMS does not refer to non-moral properties that make objects have moral properties and that there are no true moral principles of the relevant kind. In sections 6 and 7, I defend SMS against these two consequences. In doing so, I distinguish two uses of ‘make’ and provide a pragmatic account of the distinction between non-moral properties that make objects have moral properties and enablers. 

2. General Moral Supervenience and Resultance
Dancy formulates the version of supervenience that he focuses on roughly in the following way:

General Moral Supervenience (GMS): It is necessary that if an object has a moral property, then any other object which shares all the non-moral properties with the first object has the moral property too.​[1]​
 
According to this principle, Dancy contends, the ‘supervenience base […] consists in all the non-moral features’ of an object.​[2]​ He then argues that even though the principle holds, it fails to account for our notion of the way in which non-moral properties make objects have moral properties. The reason is that we do not believe that it is all of an object’s non-moral properties that make it have a moral property; on the contrary, we assume that it might be the case that only some of an object’s non-moral properties have this function. Dancy therefore concludes that supervenience fails to account for the notion at issue. As an alternative to supervenience, he introduces the concept of resultance which he claims does not have this shortcoming. His argument for this contention, when applied to wrongness, is that ‘[t]he “resultance base” for the wrongness of a particular action consists in those features that make it wrong, the wrong-making features’, not all of the action’s non-moral features.​[3]​ 
	There is reason to believe that GMS fails in the indicated manner. However, I do not think we should stay satisfied with resultance. When Dancy characterises this concept, he does so in terms of ‘make’, ‘in virtue of’, ‘because’ and ‘depend’.​[4]​ Indeed, Dancy admits that resultance resists further explication. This is problematic for various reasons. Most obviously, it means that resultance is uninformative since it does not provide us with any account of the relation between non-moral and moral properties that improves our understanding of what this relation involves. In fact, Dancy characterises resultance by using the very terms we were hoping that the concept would illuminate. Moreover, it might be argued that this makes resultance vulnerable to a version of J. L. Mackie’s argument from queerness. Mackie famously argues that unless it is possible to explain ‘what in the world is signified by this “because”’, this relation is metaphysically queer.​[5]​ He believes that no such account can be provided and concludes therefore that this relation never is instantiated, in which case there are no moral properties.

3. Specific Moral Supervenience
In the last section, we saw that there are reasons to believe that neither GMS nor resultance succeeds to account for the notion that non-moral properties make objects have moral properties. However, I think there is a version of supervenience which is more promising in this respect. Consider:​[6]​

Specific Moral Supervenience (SMS): (i) It is necessary that, for any object x, and for any moral property M, if x has M, then there is a set of non-moral properties G such that (A) x has G, and (B) it is necessary that, for any object y, if y has G, then y has M.

(i) says, roughly put, that, necessarily, if an object has a moral property, it has some set of non-moral properties which is such that, necessarily, whatever object has that set of non-moral properties has the moral property. Although (i) constitutes the basic part of SMS, this principle should be understood to include at least two further claims. 
	Let us first observe that SMS should state a set of non-moral properties which does not contain any superfluous elements. A set of non-moral properties G should in other word contain those, and only those, elements that bring about that a given object has the moral property in question. In particular, it should contain just as many non-moral properties that are sufficient for an object to have the moral property, but not more. In order for SMS to meet this demand, we may add the requirement that there is no part of G which can be included in the formula instead of G and yet preserve its truth. Thus, SMS should be understood to include the following claim:

(ii) There is no proper subclass of G, G*, such that if G* is substituted for G, (i) is true.

Let us next observe that SMS should state an asymmetric relation between non-moral and moral properties. That one kind of properties make objects have another kind of properties is an asymmetric relation; hence, non-moral properties make objects have moral properties but not the other way around. As SMS is formulated so far, however, it expresses neither a symmetric nor an asymmetric relation. In order to be able to account for this notion, SMS should therefore include some kind of asymmetry claim. It is a difficult issue how SMS should be developed to meet this demand and I cannot give it sufficient attention here. However, one simple suggestion is to add the requirement that the reverse relation between the properties in question does not hold.​[7]​ On this proposal, SMS should be understood to include the following claim:
 
(iii): It is not the case that the reverse of the relation between moral properties and non-moral properties holds, where the relation is of a kind stated in (i).
 
This requirement can presumably be spelled out in different ways. However, it seems reasonable to understand it simply as the negation of the relation between non-moral properties and moral properties stated in (i). Thus understood (iii) claims that the following is not the case: It is necessary that, for any object x, and for any set of non-moral properties F, if x has F, then there is a moral property M such that x has M, and it is necessary that, for any object y, if y has M, then y has F.​[8]​
	It might be objected that the latter claim is too weak to secure the required asymmetry. If (iii) is understood in this way, SMS implies that there is a general asymmetric relation of a certain kind between moral properties and non-moral properties. However, one may want to argue that this does not guarantee that the relation between a particular set of non-moral properties G and a particular moral property M is asymmetric and, as a consequence, that it is insufficient to account for the notion that the former makes objects have the latter. According to (B), it is necessary that, for any object y, if y has G, y has M. In order to secure the required asymmetry, it may therefore be tempting to suggest that the reverse relation should be ruled out. On this proposal, SMS should be understood to include a claim to the effect that the following is not the case: It is necessary that, for any object y, if y has M, y has G. I think, however, that such a requirement would be too strong. On this requirement, a moral property M cannot be necessarily coextensive with a single set of non-moral properties G. According to a common view of property identity, it follows that a moral property cannot be identical to a non-moral property.​[9]​ However, it seems consistent with a correct use of ‘make’ to claim that a certain non-moral property makes objects have a certain moral property even if one believes that they are identical. To see this, suppose that a utilitarian claims that what makes actions right is that they maximise happiness and suppose further that she believes that rightness consists in maximising happiness. As far as I understand, we would not object that her use of ‘make’ is erroneous and this fact indicates that a correct use of the term is compatible with the view that identity is the case.​[10]​ Now, identity is evidently a symmetric relation. It is therefore legitimate to ask how it comes that it is legitimate to use the term in this way in spite of one believing in the identity between a moral property and a non-moral property. This is yet a difficult issue that I cannot deal with satisfactorily here. However, one answer which suggests itself is that there is a general asymmetric relation between non-moral and moral properties of the kind indicated above.​[11]​
	It seems reasonable to assume that many meta-ethicists embrace, explicitly or implicitly, principles like SMS and that it is compatible with various meta-ethical views. There are for example different ways of understanding the occurrences of ‘necessary’. Moreover, SMS does not entail that there is one particular set of non-moral properties which objects must have whenever they have a moral property; it leaves in other words room for moral properties being multiply realisable. As already indicated, the preferred understanding of SMS is also compatible with moral properties being identical to non-moral properties.
	As these remarks suggest, it should be stressed that SMS as it stands does not provide a complete account of the notion that non-moral properties make objects have moral properties. Most obviously, in order to claim that it does, it would be necessary to say more about its different parts than I can do here; especially, the asymmetry requirement should be discussed more fully. Moreover, it would be vital to specify its various key elements; especially, the two occurrences of ‘necessarily’ should be identified.​[12]​ In section 7, I also suggest that SMS should be supplemented with certain pragmatic considerations in order to capture a use of ‘make’ which is essential when we claim that non-moral properties make objects have moral properties. There might also be other ways in which SMS needs to be amended. In addition, objections against it should be discussed and responded to.​[13]​ However, if what I have said so far is fairly correct, SMS constitutes at least a basis for the required kind of account.
	The point I would like to stress here is that this version of supervenience is not vulnerable to Dancy’s argument against supervenience I mentioned in the last section. The kind of set of non-moral properties referred to in SMS—G—does not need to contain all of an object’s non-moral properties but may contain only some of these. Hence, there is no reason to believe that SMS in this particular respect is unable to account for the notion that non-moral properties make objects have moral properties. Moreover, unlike resultance, SMS does not utilise ‘make’ and related terms. There is therefore reason to believe that, if SMS is correct, it contributes to an informative account of this relation which improves our understanding of it. Accordingly, SMS seems capable of avoiding the main argument against resultance. Since SMS as it stands does not provide a complete account of the relation at issue, what I have said above is insufficient as a response to the pertinent version of Mackie’s argument from queerness. However, there is reason to believe that SMS, unlike resultance, at least supplies a base for a response to this worry.
	Let us now turn to the question of what consequence particularism has for supervenience. It might be maintained, as Dancy evidently does, that particularism means that supervenience quite generally is unable to account for the notion that non-moral properties make objects have moral properties.​[14]​ Thus, it might be argued that particularism implies that SMS fails to account for this notion. In the remainder of the paper, I will consider whether this is the case.

4. Specific Moral Supervenience and Holism
According to one conception of particularism, it consists in the view Dancy calls ‘holism’:

Particularism, I want to say, is an expression of a general holism in the theory of reasons; it is the application of holism to the moral case. Holism in the theory of reasons holds that a feature that is a reason in favour in one case may be no reason at all in another, and in a third may even be a reason against.​[15]​

As Dancy formulates holism here, it is a claim about the features that constitute normative reasons for performing actions.​[16]​ However, Dancy assumes generally that what holds for reasons also holds for the mainly metaphysical make-relation. Hence, he believes that what holds for the features that constitute reasons to perform actions holds for the non-moral properties that make objects have moral properties. Dancy advocates accordingly holism understood as a claim about the non-moral properties that make objects have moral properties as well.​[17]​   
	Understood in the latter way, holism is the view that the relevance of non-moral properties is context-dependent. It can be formulated in the following way: a non-moral property which, when instantiated in one object, contributes to the object having a certain moral property, might, when instantiated in another object, contribute to that object not having the moral property, and might, when instantiated in yet another object, contribute in neither of these ways.​[18]​ Suppose A is such a property. The reason why A’s relevance varies in this way is that some of the object’s other non-moral properties determine whether A is relevant and, if it is, which relevance it has. The relevance of A is thus context-dependent, where the context is made up by other non-moral properties of the object. 
	Advocates of this view find support for it in various thought experiments of which the following is an example.​[19]​ Suppose an action causes pleasure and that we think that it is right because it has that non-moral property. This fact may have us believe that causing pleasure always contributes to actions being right. To see that this is not at all evident, imagine that an action of punishing someone causes pleasure to those who are witnessing the action. In that case, we might be inclined to say, causing pleasure does not contribute to the action being right. Perhaps we would even say that it contributes to the action not being right. If this is correct, the relevance of causing pleasure varies depending on the context made up by other non-moral properties of the action, e.g. that of being a punishment.
	Now, I think that the view that SMS provides a basis for an account of the notion that non-moral properties make objects have moral properties is compatible with the relevance of non-moral properties being context-dependent. The basic reason is this. A set of non-moral properties of the kind referred to in SMS, and which makes objects have a moral property according to this claim, might consist of a number of non-moral properties. Within such a set, the relevance of a non-moral property might be context-dependent, where the context is made up by other non-moral properties in the set.
	Consider the following simple account of how this can be the case. Suppose an object has the following set of non-moral properties: A & -B & C. Assume that this set of non-moral properties is of the kind referred to in SMS and that it consequently makes an object have a moral property M according to the view suggested here.​[20]​ In this set, A might contribute to the object having M. This can be understood in the following way: in this set, A is such that if the object had not had A, it would not have had M. That is, if the object had had the other non-moral properties in the set (i.e. -B & C), but not A, it would not have had M.​[21]​ However, suppose another object has the following set of non-moral properties: A & B & C. Assume that this set does not make the object have M. In this set, A might contribute to the object not having M. This can be understood in the following way: in this set, A is such that if the object had not had A, it would have had M. That is, if the object had had the other non-moral properties in the set (i.e. B & C), but not A, it would have had M. Or, in this set, A might contribute in neither of these ways.​[22]​ Thus, whether A is relevant, and, if it is, which relevance it has, is determined by other non-moral properties in respective set of non-moral properties, i.e. A’s relevant context. In the examples, the active part of the context is -B and B, respectively. 
	This account of the relevance of non-moral properties being context-dependent can be applied to the example above. Let the moral property, M, be ‘rightness’, A ‘causing pleasure’ and B e.g. ‘being a punishment’. In the first set of non-moral properties (A & 
-B & C), A contributes to the object having M because it figures in a context partly made up by -B. In the second set of non-moral properties (A & B & C), A contributes to the object not having M, or contributes in neither way, because it figures in a context made up partly by B.​[23]​ 

5. Specific Moral Supervenience and Moral Principles
According to the second main conception of particularism, it is the view that there are no true moral principles. Thus understood, particularism seems indeed incompatible with SMS. The reason is that SMS contains (B)—a necessary implication from a set of non-moral properties to a moral property—and such an implication seems to constitute a kind of moral principle. 
	However, it is important to observe that SMS is compatible with other sceptical views about moral principles that philosophers known as particularists may embrace. The kind of moral principle involved in SMS is primarily metaphysical since it concerns the way in which non-moral properties make objects have moral properties. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that it is compatible with the view that no other kinds of moral principles are true. For instance, as we will see in the next section, it is possible to argue that it is compatible with the view that there are no true moral principles that concern what reasons there are to perform actions.​[24]​
	Dancy and other particularists sometimes suggest that the relevance of non-moral properties being context-dependent means that there are no true moral principles.​[25]​ This view seems unfounded. As we saw in the previous section, the view that the relevance of non-moral properties is context-dependent is compatible with SMS. However, SMS involves (B), which, as just mentioned, seems to constitute a kind of moral principle. Hence, the relevance of non-moral properties being context-dependent is compatible with the truth of at least one kind of moral principle. 
	However, it might be argued that scepticism against this kind of moral principle is supported by a certain distinction. Dancy distinguishes between features that constitute reasons to perform actions, what he calls ‘favourers’, and features that do not constitute reasons themselves but merely enable other features to constitute such reasons, what he calls ‘enablers’. As I mentioned earlier, Dancy assumes that what holds for the features that constitute reasons holds for the non-moral properties that make objects have moral properties as well. Thus, he distinguishes between non-moral properties that make objects have moral properties and non-moral properties that merely enable other non-moral properties to make objects have moral properties, also called enablers.​[26]​ It is particularly the latter distinction which concerns us here.​[27]​ 
	Dancy argues for the distinction between what makes objects have moral properties and enablers partly by means of examples. I think this way of arguing is dubious. It is a matter of substantial normative argument whether the non-moral properties he appeals to are relevant at all to objects having moral properties, either as non-moral properties that make objects have a moral property or as enablers. Especially, I think many moral philosophers would object that the non-moral properties that are claimed to make objects have moral properties are too specific to have this function.​[28]​ It is therefore controversial whether these examples support the distinction. 
	Nevertheless, Dancy’s overall argument why a non-moral property that he classifies as an enabler does not make, say, an action right seems to be that it is not ‘something for which we judge the action to be right’.​[29]​ His general argument for claiming that a certain non-moral property is an enabler rather than something that makes objects have a moral property seems in other words to be that it does not constitute a reason to believe that an object has the moral property in question. Dancy admits, however, that he does not know how to draw the distinction and that it is easy to find examples of cases where it is not clear how to categorise a certain non-moral property.​[30]​ He has for instance abandoned the idea that enablers always are negative non-moral properties. 
	Thus, Dancy argues for the view that a non-moral property which he classifies as an enabler cannot make objects have a moral property. However, he also embraces a further view: that a set of non-moral properties which includes such a non-moral property as a part cannot have this function either.​[31]​ As far as I see, Dancy does not always distinguish clearly between these views, and one gets the impression that he takes the first to support the second. However, it is the latter view which has consequences for SMS. 
	First, it means that SMS may refer to a kind of set of non-moral properties which cannot make objects have a moral property. A set of non-moral properties of the kind referred to in SMS may include a non-moral property that Dancy classifies as an enabler. According to Dancy’s view, it follows that such a set of non-moral properties does not make an object have a moral property. Second, it means that a moral principle of the kind stated in (B) may turn out to be false. Such a moral principle concerns the way in which non-moral properties make objects have moral properties.​[32]​ According to Dancy’s view, a set of non-moral properties that includes a non-moral property which he classifies as an enabler cannot make objects have a moral property. It follows that if a version of (B) cites such a set of non-moral properties, it does not constitute a true moral principle. 
	In the next two sections, I will argue that these consequences can be avoided. Since the second consequence can be seen as an implication of the first, I will focus on the first.	
6. Complexes of Non-moral Properties
Let us assume for the sake of the argument that Dancy is correct in his first view mentioned above: that a non-moral property which he classifies as an enabler cannot make objects have a moral property. We may still refute his further view: that a set of non-moral properties which includes such a non-moral property cannot have this function either. It is evident that the first view does not entail the second. Even if a non-moral property which Dancy classifies as an enabler by itself cannot make objects have a moral property, it might be part of a set of non-moral properties which has this function.
	There seems to be a rather simple way in which this is possible. Dancy distinguishes, as we have seen, between non-moral properties that make objects have moral properties and enablers. Now, there are complexes of non-moral properties which consist of combinations of non-moral properties of the first kind with non-moral properties of the second kind. To illustrate, consider one of Dancy’s favourite examples of the distinction.​[33]​ Suppose a person has promised to perform an action and that she ought to do it. In Dancy’s view, the action being such that she has promised to perform it makes it have that moral property. According to the principle that ought implies can, unless the person is able to perform the action, it is not the case that she ought to perform it. In Dancy’s view, the action being such that the person is able perform it is an example of an enabler. The combination of these two non-moral properties makes up a complex of non-moral properties. There might be further non-moral properties of either kind which can be added so as to obtain a more comprehensive complex of that kind. 
	It seems reasonable to argue that there are complexes of non-moral properties—that is, complexes which include both non-moral properties that Dancy believes make objects have moral properties and non-moral properties he classifies as enablers—that make objects have moral properties. There are at least three reasons for this view. First, a non-moral property which, in Dancy’s view, makes an object have a moral property is combined with a non-moral property which, to exactly the same extent, is responsible for the object having the moral property. It then seems reasonable to maintain that if we accept that the first non-moral property makes an object have a moral property, we should accept that such a complex of non-moral properties can have this function as well. In fact, we would seem to have reached a fuller account of what makes the object have the moral property. Second, if a single non-moral property is a reason to believe that an object has a moral property, such a complex of non-moral properties can clearly constitute such a reason as well. In that case it would seem to qualify as something that makes objects have a moral property, rather than being an enabler, according to Dancy’s own argument. Third, it finds support in our way of thinking about what makes objects have moral properties. Suppose we ask why it is the case that a person ought to perform a certain action, say help another human being. One reasonable answer might be ‘She promised to help her’. But another reasonable answer might be ‘She promised to help and she’s able to do so’, or an answer which cites a more comprehensive complex of non-moral properties. These answers seem to differ mainly as regards how specific and complicated considerations they provide in support of the action having the moral property in question. 
	A complex of non-moral properties which, according to the reasoning above, makes objects have a moral property exemplifies a set of non-moral properties of the sort I had in mind earlier: one that includes what Dancy classifies as an enabler. The kind of set of non-moral properties referred to in SMS might constitute such a complex of non-moral properties. Hence, there is reason to believe that it can make objects have a moral property even if it contains a non-moral property which Dancy takes to be an enabler.
	However, Dancy refutes what he calls ‘the agglomerative principle’ according to which a feature that constitutes a reason to perform an action in combination with an enabler makes up a more complex reason of that kind.​[34]​ As already mentioned, Dancy believes that what holds for the features that constitute reasons also holds for the non-moral properties that make objects have moral properties. Consequently, he denies the agglomerative principle as regards the latter notion as well. On this view, a complex of non-moral properties which includes what he classifies as an enabler cannot make objects have a moral property. 
	Dancy’s main argument against the agglomerative principle takes its point of departure in an example. Suppose a person has promised to perform an action and that she ought to do it. Suppose further that if the person had given her promise under duress, the action had not had this moral property. Formulated in terms of non-moral properties, Dancy seems to understand this case in the following way. The action being such that the person has promised to perform it constitutes a reason for her to do it. However, the action not being such that the promise to perform it was given under duress merely constitutes an enabler. Dancy then argues that it is mistaken to think that these two non-moral properties make up a complex—the action being such that the person freely promised to perform it—which constitutes a reason for her to do it.​[35]​ He writes:
 
[T]hose who recognize that their promise was deceitfully extracted from them often feel some compunction in not doing what they promised, even though they themselves recognize that in such circumstances their promise does not play its normal reason-giving role. I think their attitude would be different if what plays the reason-giving role were not that one promised but that one ‘freely’ promised (where to be free a promise must not be extracted by deceit). For on that hypothesis there would be no sign of a favourer in the case at all.​[36]​ 

Dancy’s argument is, as I understand it, that the agglomerative principle cannot account for the following type of cases. Suppose a person has promised to perform an action but that the promise was given under duress. Then it is not the case that she ought to do it. The person may nonetheless feel compunction for not performing the action. The explanation seems to be that she believes that her having promised to perform the action still gives her a reason to do it. Especially, she believes this in spite of being aware that her promise ‘does not play its normal reason-giving role’ because it was given under duress and that she therefore may have a stronger reason not to do the action in question.​[37]​ 
	As far as I understand, it would be difficult to argue that cases of the kind Dancy describes cannot occur. It is reasonable to maintain, however, that he is not in the position to appeal to such cases when arguing against the agglomerative principle since his own view on reasons seems unable to account for them.​[38]​ According to Dancy’s view, that a person has promised to perform an action is a reason for her to do it only if a certain enabler is in place, namely that it is not the case that her promise was given under duress. This view entails that if the promise was given under duress, her having promised to perform the action is no reason for her to do it. But the situation Dancy describes seems precisely to be one in which a person believes that she has a reason to do what she has promised to do even if her promise was given under duress.​[39]​  
	Nevertheless, it might still be asked how Dancy’s argument in relation to the agglomerative principle should be responded to. Below I suggest two different responses. However, I do not discuss which of them that is preferable since that would take us too far.
	(1) When Dancy discusses the agglomerative principle, he seems to presume that, on this principle, a single non-moral property cannot constitute a reason, but that only a complex of non-moral properties can do so. Thus, the single non-moral property of an action being such that a person has promised to perform it does not constitute a reason for her to do it, but this function is only had by a complex of non-moral properties, e.g. the action being such that she freely promised to perform it. This explains why Dancy thinks that the agglomerative principle cannot account for cases where a person believes that her having promised to perform an action gives her a reason to do it even if she is aware that she gave the promise under duress and that she therefore may have a stronger reason not to do it.
	However, advocates of the agglomerative principle need not accept this presumption. They may maintain that a complex of non-moral properties—e.g. an action being such that a person freely promised to perform it—constitutes a reason for her to perform the action. Yet, they may maintain that a non-moral property which is part of the complex—e.g. an action being such that a person has promised to perform it—also constitutes such a reason. This view leaves consequently open the possibility that reasons vary in specificity and strength. 
	On this view, it is possible to account for the kind of cases Dancy appeals to in this argument. We might maintain that an action being such that a person has promised to perform it constitutes a reason for her to do it although she has a stronger reason not to perform the action since she gave her promise under duress and hence not freely. 
	If this reasoning is plausible, advocates of the agglomerative principle may uphold it as regards the features that constitute reasons. In that case there are, as far as I see, no grounds for believing that it does not hold for the non-moral properties that make objects have moral properties as well. Thus, a complex of non-moral properties which involves what Dancy classifies as an enabler can make objects have a moral property.
	(2) As we have seen, Dancy assumes that what holds for the features that constitute reasons to perform actions also holds for the non-moral properties that make objects have moral properties. He denies accordingly the agglomerative principle as regards both notions. As a consequence, he believes that a complex of non-moral properties which contains what he classifies as an enabler neither can constitute a reason to perform an action nor make actions have a moral property. However, the mentioned assumption is open to doubt. We may accordingly deny the agglomerative principle as regards the features that constitute reasons but accept it as regards the non-moral properties that make objects have moral properties. In other words, the following view suggests itself: a complex of non-moral properties which includes what Dancy classifies as an enabler does not constitute a reason for action but it may still make objects have a moral property. 
	It might first be noted that the view that there is such a difference between the features that constitute reasons and the non-moral properties that make objects have moral properties should not strike us as particularly surprising since they concern different matters: the first notion concerns what constitute reasons whereas the second concerns a primarily metaphysical make-relation. Moreover, this view does not need to be particularly radical since it is compatible with the notion that what constitutes the relevant kind of reasons and what makes objects have moral properties come apart only to a limited extent. On this view, there are certain parts of what makes objects have a moral property that are not part of what constitutes the reasons in question, namely what Dancy classifies as enablers. However, each non-moral property which constitutes such a reason may be part of what makes objects have a certain moral property.
	One ground for accepting this view is that we seem to have different conceptions of what function non-moral properties have with respect to reasons for action and with respect to the make-relation. To see this, we might compare a view about reasons with the corresponding view about rightness. Consider first a simple internalist view of reasons according to which a person has a reason to perform an action in so far as she desires to perform it. We would presumably not say that, on this view, the person having a desire to perform a certain action needs to be part of her reason to perform that action.​[40]​ Rather, her having such a desire is a standing precondition for something to constitute a reason to perform an action. In Dancy’s terminology it can be characterised as a permanent enabler. Consider next subjectivism about rightness according to which an action is right for a person to perform in so far as she desires to perform it. Here we seem inclined to say that, on this view, the action being such that the person has a desire to perform it is something that makes it right. We would presumably have the same result if we considered other views of reasons and moral properties. Hence, there are grounds to believe that a non-moral property which is classified as an enabler is not part of a reason to perform actions but is part of what makes objects have a moral property. Another justification for this view is the notion that reasons, at least in favourable circumstances, figure in a person’s practical deliberation about what to do whereas what makes actions have moral properties need not do so. It can then be argued that considerations such as that a person has not given a promise under duress or that she is able to perform an action are not, at least not normally, part of her practical deliberation and hence not part of her reasons.​[41]​ However, they may still be part of what makes actions have moral properties. 
	On this view, it is possible to account for the kind of cases Dancy appeals to in his argument. We might maintain that what constitutes a person’s reason to perform an action is that it is such that she has promised to do it, not a complex of non-moral properties which includes a non-moral property which Dancy classifies as an enabler, e.g. the action being such that she freely promised to do it. Hence, a non-moral property which Dancy classifies as an enabler—e.g. an action not being such that the promise to perform it was given under duress—is not part of a reason to perform an action. However, this view leaves open the possibility that although such a non-moral property is not part of a reason, it is relevant to the nature and strength of the reasons a person has to perform an action. In that case we can maintain that an action being such that a person has promised to perform it constitutes a reason for her to do it even if her promise was given under duress and that she therefore has a stronger reason not to perform the action.
	This view might have consequences for what kind of moral principles are true. If a non-moral property which Dancy classifies as an enabler cannot be part of a complex of non-moral properties which constitutes a reason for action, it might be the case that there are no true moral principles that state such reasons. However, if what he classifies as an enabler can be part of a complex of non-moral properties which makes objects have a moral property, there is ground for believing that there are moral principles which state what makes objects have such properties. Hence, it might be the case that there are moral principles concerning the make-relation but not concerning reasons.​[42]​   

7. Two Uses of ‘Make’
In the previous section, I argued that a set of non-moral properties which involves what Dancy classifies as an enabler can make objects have a moral property. As I pointed out, there is therefore reason to believe that a set of non-moral properties of the kind referred to in SMS can have this function even if it includes such a non-moral property. In the present section, I will argue that this view is confirmed by considerations of two pertinent uses of ‘make’.
	Let us start by considering the kind of set of non-moral properties referred to in SMS. Such a set consists of those, but only those, non-moral properties that are sufficient for an object to have a certain moral property. Next, consider a part of such a set of non-moral properties. Each such non-moral property, or combination of non-moral properties, is a necessary part of a sufficient condition for an object to have a moral property. It is in other words a necessary condition for a particular set of non-moral properties to be a sufficient condition of the indicated kind.​[43]​
	Now, I think it can be argued that when we claim that non-moral properties make objects have moral properties, we may have in mind either a part of such a set of non-moral properties or the set in its entirety.
	The pragmatic use of ‘make’. According to the first use of ‘make’, what makes objects have a moral property might be a part of a set non-moral properties of the kind referred to in SMS; it need not be an entire set of that kind. 
	If we understand ‘make’ in this way, we are in the position to account for Dancy’s distinction between non-moral properties that make objects have a certain moral property and enablers. We may consider a certain part of a set of non-moral properties of the kind referred to in SMS as what makes an object have a moral property. And we may consider a certain other part of such a set as an enabler. To illustrate, take another of Dancy’s examples. Suppose we believe that a person is good. We might want to claim that what makes her good is, say, her being considerate. Furthermore, we might believe that if she had been cruel, she would not have been good. In Dancy’s view, her not being cruel is an enabler.​[44]​ In the mentioned kind of set of non-moral properties, being considerate can then be regarded as something that makes the person good whereas not being cruel can be thought to constitute an enabler.
	It might be asked why we consider a certain non-moral property as something that makes an object have a moral property whereas another non-moral property is considered as an enabler. Suppose we believe that a certain non-moral property is a necessary part of a sufficient condition for an object to have a moral property in the way just mentioned. Put abstractly, I think it is plausible to maintain that we regard such a non-moral property as one that makes the object have the moral property because we for some reason find it significant in consideration of the object having that moral property. Similarly, we consider another non-moral property of that kind as an enabler because we do not find it thus significant. Whether such a non-moral property is found to be significant or not depends, I think, on pragmatic factors. 
	According to the account of the pragmatic use of ‘make’ that I favour, a non-moral property which is considered significant in view of an object having a moral property is part of an explanation of a certain kind. The idea is, briefly put, this. When we claim that a certain non-moral property makes an object have a moral property, we put forward an explanation of what makes the object have that moral property. According to an established view of explanations, we select certain pieces of information as explanations because we find them significant as a consequence of being directed by various pragmatic considerations. Thus, in explaining what makes an object have a moral property, we refer to a non-moral property of the kind indicated above which we take to be significant as to why the object has the moral property in question. Moreover, whether we consider such a non-moral property as significant or not depends on broadly pragmatic considerations.​[45]​ What these considerations consist of may presumably vary. However, put very generally, whether a non-moral property is considered as significant or not depends on the context at issue, in particular on the context represented by the beliefs of the people for whom the explanation is intended. It depends, for instance, on their beliefs about the relation between moral properties and non-moral properties and their beliefs about the circumstances in which they find themselves.​[46]​ (Needless to say, often we are not aware that we select a non-moral property as what makes an object have a moral property on these grounds.)​[47]​
	A very general reason why a certain non-moral property is regarded as significant in consideration of an object having a moral property is probably that, in a given context, it is presumed that it has certain other non-moral properties. As a consequence, a non-moral property that is thought to make an object have a moral property is considered as more significant as compared with these ‘presumed’ non-moral properties, some of which are classified as enablers. A non-moral property that is thought to make an object have a moral property stands thus out as remarkable against a background of non-moral properties which are taken for granted to belong to the object. To illustrate, suppose again that a person being considerate is considered as something that makes her good whereas her not being cruel is considered as an enabler. According to the present suggestion, the reason might be that these non-moral properties differ in significance since, in the context at issue, it is presumed that the person is not cruel, whereas it is not in a similar manner presumed that she is considerate. 
	This ground for distinguishing between non-moral properties that make objects have moral properties and enablers is presumably reinforced by the fact that we in ordinary communication are governed by pragmatic concerns (understood in a more narrow sense than above). Generally we only utter sentences that we believe are relevant to the people we are communicating with by providing them with information that we believe that they are not already familiar with.​[48]​ As a consequence, we do not normally provide information to the effect that objects have certain features which we believe that people already presume objects have. It is reasonable to assume that this affects what non-moral properties we select as those that make objects have moral properties. In particular, it prevents us from claiming that what makes an object have a moral property is a non-moral property which we believe that people presume belongs to the object.
	One reason why people presume that an object has a certain non-moral property might in turn be that they believe that objects have to have it in order to have the moral property in question. That is, it might be thought that it holds for any object that if it does not have the non-moral property, it cannot have the moral property. One example might be the relation between the non-moral property of not being cruel and a person being good. The same applies perhaps to the example above which rests on the principle that ought implies can. Another reason why people presume that an object has a certain non-moral property might simply be that they believe that objects belonging to the relevant kind normally have that non-moral property. As people’s views about these matters presumably may vary, there are grounds to believe that what is considered to make objects have a moral property may vary accordingly.
	Moreover, whether a non-moral property is considered as significant might according to this account also depend on what people believe to be the case in the circumstances in which they find themselves. As a consequence, what is thought to make an object have a moral property may vary depending on what they believe about the circumstances in question. To illustrate, we might recall one of the examples I discussed in the last section. In Dancy’s view, an action being such that a person has promised to perform it makes it such that the person ought to do it, whereas the action not being such that the promise was given under duress merely constitutes an enabler. We also saw that in Dancy’s view the combination of these two non-moral properties does not make the action have the moral property in question. However, it is plausible to argue that whether this description is plausible depends on what is thought about the circumstances in question. Consider first a situation where an action has the two non-moral properties just mentioned. In this situation, we may suppose, people are not generally forced to promise to perform actions. As a consequence, it is generally presumed that promises are not given under duress. This is probably the circumstances we find ourselves in. Admittedly, in such a situation it seems plausible to describe the case in the way Dancy does. However, consider now another situation. In this situation an action has exactly the same non-moral properties that are had by the action in the first situation, including the two the non-moral properties just mentioned. However, here people quite generally are forced to promise to perform actions under duress. In such circumstances it cannot generally be presumed that promises are not given under duress; on the contrary, it can quite generally be expected that certain promises are given under duress. Now, that an action has the non-moral property Dancy classifies as an enabler seems in such a situation to stand out as remarkable against a background of other properties which the action is thought to have. It seems therefore plausible to assume that when people in this situation come to believe that the person in question ought to perform the action, they consider this non-moral property as significant. As a result, rather than taking it to be an enabler, they may take it as something that makes the action such that it ought to be done. In particular, it seems reasonable for them to hold that the mentioned complex of non-moral properties—the action being such that the person freely promised to perform it—makes the action have the moral property.​[49]​ On either alternative, what Dancy classifies as an enabler would contribute to what is thought to make an action have a moral property.​[50]​ 
	As we have seen, the present account of the pragmatic use of ‘make’ is confirmed by the observation that what is thought to make an object have a moral property might vary. It is further confirmed by the fact that it is able to explain two phenomena I have alluded to earlier. 
	First, it is able to explain why many non-moral properties that Dancy classifies as enablers are negative properties (e.g. an action not being such that the promise to perform it was given under duress). According to the present suggestion, one reason why a non-moral property is considered as an enabler is that it is presumed that the object in question has it. Now, it is quite natural that we typically presume that an object has a negative property, i.e. a property an object has in virtue of not having a certain property. This is so since we generally presuppose that objects lack properties in case we do not have any information to the effect that they have these properties. 
	Furthermore, it is able to explain Dancy’s view that there does not seem to be any clear distinction between non-moral properties that make objects have a moral property and enablers, and that it is easy to find examples of cases where it is not clear how to categorise a certain non-moral property in these terms. According to the present account, which category a non-moral property belongs to depends on the context of the object in question, where the context primarily is represented by people’s beliefs. Since an object’s context of this kind may vary, whether a non-moral property is thought to make the object have a moral property or merely is considered as an enabler may vary accordingly. Moreover, as it might be unclear what makes up the pertinent context of an object, it might be unclear how to categorise a given non-moral property.​[51]​
	In the last section, I provided some general arguments to the effect that a set of non-moral properties of the kind referred to in SMS can make objects have a moral property even if it includes what Dancy classifies as an enabler. What I have said above about the pragmatic use of ‘make’ provides helps to support this view. As I have already indicated, I think it is uncontroversial to assume that when we claim that non-moral properties make objects have moral properties, we have primarily in mind a metaphysical relation. Admittedly, we pick out certain non-moral properties as what makes objects have moral properties and consider others as enablers. However, we do so because in explaining what makes objects have moral properties, we select certain non-moral properties as significant as a consequence of being directed by various pragmatic considerations. But from a metaphysical point of view, there is no relevant difference between these non-moral properties; each of them is a necessary part of a sufficient condition for an object to have a moral property. Hence, it is in accordance with the pragmatic use of ‘make’ to maintain that such a set of non-moral properties can make objects have a moral property in spite of it including what Dancy takes to be an enabler.​[52]​
	The strict use of ‘make’. According to this use of ‘make’, what makes objects have a moral property is a set of non-moral properties of the kind referred to in SMS in its entirety, not a part of it.​[53]​ It follows that such a set of non-moral properties makes objects have a moral property even if it contains a non-moral property which Dancy classifies as an enabler.
	We saw earlier that there are reasons to believe that it is correct to use ‘make’ in this way. The following considerations confirm this view.
	First, it seems to find support in common parlance. Suppose someone claims that a person is good because she is considerate. Against this someone might object: ‘But that doesn’t make her a good person’, stressing ‘make’. To support this view, the objector might argue that if the person in question is cruel, she is not good. As far as I understand, this is perfectly consistent with a correct use of ‘make’. One reasonable interpretation of this objection is that for a set of non-moral properties to make a person good, it has to provide a sufficient condition for the person to be good. According to the objector, being considerate is not thus sufficient; it also has to involve the non-moral property of not being cruel and perhaps other non-moral properties as well.​[54]​ 
	Second, it finds support in the fact that the use of ‘make’ at issue primarily refers to a metaphysical relation. Earlier I pointed out that from a metaphysical point of view there is no relevant difference between the various parts of a set of non-moral properties of the kind referred to in SMS. More precisely, each such non-moral property is a necessary part of a sufficient condition for an object to have a moral property. Thus, what is metaphysically responsible for an object having a moral property is not a single part of such a set of non-moral properties but rather the set in its entirety. As I mentioned above, it seems uncontroversial to assume that when we claim that non-moral properties make objects have moral properties, we have primarily in mind a metaphysical relation. It is then reasonable to claim that a set of non-moral properties of the kind referred to in SMS in its entirety can make objects have a moral property. At least, it is difficult to deny that it is appropriate to use ‘make’ in this way, even if there also are other legitimate uses of the term. 
	Relatedly, the strict use of ‘make’ seems more fundamental than the pragmatic. As we have seen, we adopt a pragmatic use of ‘make’ because we feel a need to single out certain non-moral properties when we put forward explanations of a certain kind. However, since ‘make’ primarily refers to a metaphysical relation, the strict use of the term seems more fundamental.
	Moreover, it might be argued that this view is supported by our notion of what is involved in explanations of what makes objects have moral properties. Above I maintained that when we put forward such explanations, we select certain non-moral properties that we find significant because we are directed by various pragmatic considerations. However, I do not think we would deny that a set of non-moral properties of the kind referred to in SMS in its entirety also can explain what makes an object have a moral property. Indeed, since such a set contains those, but only those, non-moral properties that together are sufficient for an object to have that moral property, it might be argued that it, in a certain sense, provides a complete explanation or ‘the explanation’ of what makes the object have the moral property in question.​[55]​        

8. Conclusion
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^1	  Dancy (2004: 86). Dancy does not explicitly claim that the principle he is concerned with holds with necessity, but what he writes indicates that he understands it in that way. As formulated here, GMS is a version of weak supervenience; however, this does not affect Dancy’s argument. For a useful discussion of different versions of supervenience, see McLaughlin (1995: 16–59).    
^2	  Dancy (2004: 86). See also Dancy (1981: 381), and Dancy (1993: 78). Cf. Grimes (1991: 88–9), and McKeever and Ridge (2006: 8). 
^3	  Dancy (2004: 86). 
^4	  See e.g. Dancy (1981: 367, 380–2); Dancy (1993: 73–7), and Dancy (2004: 85–9).  
^5	  Mackie (1977: 41). It might be replied that Mackie’s argument fails since if it were correct, it would apply to all dependence relations between properties in which case it would follow, implausibly, that there are no properties which depend on other properties. For related objections, see Brink (1989: 173–4), and Shafer-Landau (2003: 88). Unfortunately, I cannot discuss Mackie’s argument here.  
^6	  As easily can be seen, (i) in SMS is a version of one of Jaegwon Kim’s formulations of strong supervenience; see e.g. Kim (1993 (1984): 57–67). When I refer to a set of non-moral properties, such as G in SMS, I have in mind a non-empty set which consists of a single non-moral property or a conjunction of such properties.
^7	  Cf. Kim (1993 (1990): 144–5).
^8	  If (iii) is understood in this way, SMS implies that there is a certain general asymmetry between moral and non-moral properties. According to (i) in SMS, it holds, necessarily, for all moral properties that if an object has a moral property, it has some set of non-moral properties which is such that, necessarily, whatever object has that set of non-moral properties has the moral property in question. However, according to (iii) in SMS, it is not the case that it holds, necessarily, for all sets of non-moral properties, that if an object has a set of non-moral properties, it has some moral property which is such that, necessarily, whatever object has that moral property has the set of non-moral properties in question. It should be noted that this claim leaves open the possibility that the last-mentioned relation holds for some sets of non-moral properties. As a consequence, understood in this way SMS is compatible with a moral property being necessarily coextensive with a single set of non-moral properties and, consequently, with the possibility that a moral property is identical to a non-moral property.
^9	  Kim argues that strong supervenience entails that the supervenient property is necessarily coextensive with a property which consists of the disjunction of the various sets of properties it supervenes on. See e.g. Kim (1993 (1990): 150–5). (For a similar argument, see Jackson (1998: 122–3).) As noted earlier, (i) in SMS is a version of one of Kim’s formulations of strong supervenience. According to Kim’s argument, a moral property M is consequently necessarily coextensive with a non-moral property which consists of a disjunction of the various sets of non-moral properties it supervenes on (G1, G2, etc.). It might be claimed that this means that a moral property can be identical with a non-moral property even if there is no necessary implication from a moral property M to a single set of non-moral properties G. This is an important argument which I cannot do justice to here. But it should be noticed that it is highly controversial whether properties are closed under disjunction and that it is generally assumed that necessary coextension is not sufficient for property identity.
^10	  Cf. Post (1999: 320–5).
^11	  Cf. Kim (1993 (1984): 67). Another possible answer is that there is some kind of non-metaphysical asymmetry between non-moral and moral properties. In particular, there might be an explanatory asymmetry in virtue of the fact that non-moral properties are explanatorily prior to moral properties. Cf. Post (1999: 325–30). Consider the following statements: (1) ‘What makes actions right is that they maximise happiness’ and (2) ‘What makes actions maximise happiness is that they are right’. (1) seems more plausible than (2). One reason might be that we understand (1) and (2) as explanations and that we take (1) to be a more plausible explanation than (2). One reason for the latter view may in turn be that the thought that explanations in terms of the non-moral property are part of a comprehensive ethical theory, such as utilitarianism, whereas explanations in terms of the moral property are not. As a result, we believe that the former are explanatorily more powerful—explain more phenomena—and informative than the latter. As a result (1) seems more plausible than (2). I will briefly return to this idea in section 7.
^12	  Most meta-ethicists would presumably agree that the first occurrence of ‘necessary’ should be understood as analytic necessity, but they disagree as to how the second occurrence should be understood. Elsewhere I argue for a particular reading of SMS; see Strandberg (2004). Among other things, I suggest that the first occurrence of ‘necessary’ should be understood as analytic necessity and the second occurrence as a certain kind of synthetic necessity. 
^13	  Principles like SMS have been put into question on various grounds; see e.g. Blackburn (1993 (1985)). I respond to such arguments in Strandberg (2004).
^14	  See e.g. Dancy (1981: 373–5); Dancy (1993: 77–9), and Dancy (2004: 85–9). 
^15	  Dancy (1999a: 144). Cf. Dancy (2004: 7).
^16	  Strictly speaking, what provide reasons for action are presumably facts or truths rather than properties. When referring to reasons in what follows, I have in mind normative reasons.
^17	  See e.g. Dancy (2004: 78–80).
^18	  For similar formulations of holism, see e.g. Kirchin (2003: 54–5); Alm (2004: 312), and Robinson (2006: 333–7).
^19	  For this example, see McNaughton (1988: 193), and Dancy (1993: 61). It is doubtful whether not being a punishment is relevant in the required way. An advocate of particularism might reply, however, that what is relevant is instead, say, not causing sadistic pleasure. For other examples, see e.g. Dancy (1993: 60–2); Sinnott-Armstrong (1999: 3–4); Crisp (2000: 36–7); Cullity (2002: 173–4); Kirchin (2003: 57–8), and McKeever and Ridge (2006: 27).
^20	  A set of this kind may of course contain a vast number of non-moral properties; here I provide merely a simple example. It might be argued that properties are not closed under negation and, thus, that features such as ‘-B’ are not real properties. This means that what makes an object have a moral property need not strictly speaking be a set of non-moral properties, but rather a set that contains such negative features.
^21	  Put differently: if the object had not had A, and so had had the set -A & -B & C, it would not have had M. If one is sceptical towards such formulations, the following one might be preferred. Let a be the object in the example. We can then they say that, for any object, if it has -B & C, and is exactly similar to a as regards all other non-moral properties, but does not have A, it does not have M. Similar formulations are available for the other cases described below.
^22	  This can be understood in the following way. In this set of non-moral properties (A & B & C), A does not contribute to the object having M. Moreover, in this set, A does not contribute to the object not having M. In that case neither of the two conditionals mentioned in the text holds. 
^23	  The following objection can be directed against this account. The kind of set of non-moral properties that is claimed to make objects have a moral property might consist of a conjunction of non-moral properties. It is commonly assumed that properties are closed under conjunction in which case such a set of non-moral properties constitutes a non-moral property. Now, such a non-moral property contains all non-moral properties that are relevant to an object having a moral property. This means that it does not have any context that determines its relevance; the relevance of such a non-moral property is in other words not context-dependent. However, I think the account above is compatible with the basic idea in the view under consideration. The non-moral properties that defenders of this view appeal to in their examples, and whose relevance is claimed to be context-dependent, are simple properties, e.g. causing pleasure, being a promise and being considerate. But the non-moral properties that would make objects have a moral property if the relevance of simple non-moral properties as these is context-dependent would be complex, perhaps very complex, non-moral properties. 
^24	  It is also plausible to assume that it is compatible with the view that there are no true moral principles of other kinds. For an overview of various conceptions of moral principles, see McKeever and Ridge (2006: 5–14). Dancy has characterised particularism in different ways over the years. In his recent book, he defines holism in the way mentioned above and particularism as the view that ‘the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles’ (Dancy (2004: 7)). Dancy believes that holism implies particularism thus understood. If particularism is conceived in this way it does not entail that there are no true moral principles. However, this is not essential in the present context since he, as we will see, appeals to an important distinction which might be thought to have this result.
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^37	  According to another interpretation, the person does not feel compunction because she believes that she has a reason to perform the action. Rather, she feels compunction because a promise normally plays a reason-giving role, although she is aware that it does not play that role in the case in hand. On this interpretation, however, her feeling of compunction seems entirely unfounded. But then it is difficult to see how such cases can constitute an argument against the agglomerative principle.
^38	  Cf. Raz (2006: 105).
^39	  Of course, it might be argued that in such cases a person is mistaken to believe that she has a reason to perform the action in question. However, if she does not have such a reason, the kind of cases Dancy considers cannot constitute an argument against the agglomerative principle. In what follows I therefore leave open the possibility that she actually has a reason to perform the action. However, the two accounts I provide below are compatible with this not being the case.  
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^41	  Cf. Cullity (2002: 179–80).
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^43	  This has a counterpart in J. L. Mackie’s notion of INUS-conditions; see Mackie (1974: 61–7).
^44	  Dancy (1981: 377). For the sake of the argument, I accept Dancy’s presumption that not being cruel is a non-moral property.
^45	  It might be argued that there is a parallel in the reason why a certain causal factor is selected as what causally explains an event. According to an influential view, we select a causal factor as causally explanatory because we consider it as salient in a certain context as a consequence of being directed by various pragmatic considerations. See e.g. van Fraassen (1980: Ch. 5); Woodward (1984); Lewis (1986), and Lipton (1990). 
^46	  It should be noted that this kind of context differs from the one discussed in section 4. 
^47	  It might be asked whether this pragmatic account of the distinction between what makes objects have moral properties and enablers also applies to the distinction between what constitutes reasons for action—what Dancy calls favourers—and the corresponding enablers. Although I am not committed to this view, I think the pragmatic account is generalisable in this way. For related suggestions, see Raz (2000: 59); Broome (2004: 32–5), and McKeever and Ridge (2006: 72–5).
^48	  See Grice (1989 (1975): 26–7). 
^49	  According to the pragmatic use of ‘make’, whether a certain non-moral property is considered to make an object have a moral property depends on non-metaphysical, pragmatic, factors. One consequence is, as we have seen, that negative non-moral properties, or at least complexes of non-moral properties of which such non-moral properties are part, can be claimed to make objects have moral properties in certain situations. As we will see below, according to the strict use of ‘make’ negative non-moral properties might also be part of what makes objects have moral properties. However, it might be maintained that only positive non-moral properties can make objects have moral properties whereas negative non-moral properties cannot have this function. In his early writings on particularism, Dancy seems attracted to this position; see e.g. Dancy (1993: 81). Recently Nick Zangwill has suggested a similar view; see Zangwill (2003) and his contribution to this volume. This is an interesting idea which I cannot do justice to here. However, I would like to make the following brief comments. (i) It is not entirely clear how this view should be understood. On a weak understanding it says that a negative non-moral property by itself cannot make objects have a moral property. On a strong understanding it says that a complex of non-moral properties of which such a non-moral property is part cannot have this function either. My view is compatible with the first view but not with the second. (ii) As I have just argued, in certain situations we seem prepared to claim that negative non-moral properties—or at least complexes of non-moral properties of which they are part—make objects have moral properties. (iii) Correspondingly, there are positive non-moral properties which contribute to objects having moral properties but which we in most situations would not claim make objects have moral properties. For example, an action being such that a person is able to perform it seems to be a precondition for the action to be such that she ought to perform it, but in most situations we would not claim that this non-moral property makes actions have that moral property. Hence, the distinction between non-moral properties that make objects have moral properties and those that do not have this function does not coincide with the distinction between the pertinent positive and negative non-moral properties. (iv) It might further be argued that, on this view, there are cases where there is no difference in terms of what makes objects have moral properties which can explain why two objects have different moral properties. The following illustrates what I have in mind. Suppose an action is such that it causes pain and that we believe that it is wrong. Suppose further that the action has certain negative non-moral properties which are preconditions for it being wrong, e.g. not being such that it causes pain as a consequence of medical treatment. Now, consider another action which is also such that it causes pain. However, suppose that we believe that this action is not wrong. The reason, we may suppose, is that it differs from the first action in the following way: it has the negative non-moral property of not being such that it causes pain to someone who cares about being in pain. According to one version of the view under consideration, negative non-moral properties are not part of what makes objects have moral properties. It follows that there is no difference between these two actions in terms of what makes actions have moral properties which explains why they differ morally.     
^50	  It is worth pointing out that in these two situations the actions in question have the same non-moral properties. Hence, that a non-moral property is considered as an enabler in the first situation whereas it is considered as part of something that makes an action have a moral property in the second situation cannot be explained in terms of the actions having different non-moral properties. More precisely, the explanation cannot be that in these situations the non-moral property in question has different contexts, where the contexts are made up by other non-moral properties of the actions. For a different view, see Zangwill’s contribution to this volume.
^51	  In section 3, I ventured briefly the idea that the asymmetric relation between moral and non-moral properties can be explicated in terms of the latter being explanatory prior to the former. The pragmatic account suggested here provides yet an aspect in which this might be the case. Consider again the following statements: (1) ‘What makes actions right is that they maximise happiness’ and (2) ‘What makes actions maximise happiness is that they are right’. (1) seems more plausible than (2). One reason might be this. On the pragmatic account we understand statements to the effect that non-moral properties make objects have moral properties as explanations. Moreover, explanations figure in certain contexts represented by people’s beliefs. It is reasonable to assume that explanations of what makes objects have moral properties quite generally figure in contexts where it is presumed that moral properties are more problematic and hence in need of clarification than non-moral properties. As a result (1) seems more plausible than (2). Cf. e.g. van Fraassen (1980: 130–4), and Richardson (1995).
^52	  It is worth observing that the pragmatic use of ‘make’ is compatible with the possibility that a complex of non-moral properties which includes what is considered as an enabler makes objects have a moral property even if it is not as comprehensive as a set of non-moral properties of the kind referred to in SMS. This can be accounted for in the following way. Suppose we select a non-moral property as something that makes an object have a moral property whereas another non-moral property is considered as an enabler because the first is thought significant whereas the second is not. Consider now a complex that consists of these two non-moral properties. Since the first non-moral property is considered significant, the whole complex is presumably considered so as well. We might perhaps add further non-moral properties of either kind with the same result. According to the pragmatic use of ‘make’, such a set of non-moral properties can then be claimed to make objects have a moral property.
^53	  Cf. Crisp (2000: 32–40), and Raz (2000: 49–58, 61–70).
^54	  Moreover, according to the entry on ‘make’ in the Oxford English Dictionary we sometimes use this term to refer to a relation that holds when something is a sufficient condition for something other. See ‘Make’, OED (1989: 234–7). Thus, it seems difficult to deny that it is consistent with a correct use of ‘make’ to claim that a set of non-moral properties of the kind referred to in SMS makes an object have a moral property. 
^55	  Once more there might be a parallel in causal explanations. Although we select a certain causal factor as what causally explains an event, we would presumably not deny that a complex of factors which contains those, but only those, that together are sufficient for it to occur also explains the event. Indeed, it might be claimed that it constitutes a complete causal explanation or ‘the causal explanation’ of the event in question.  See e.g. Lewis (1986: 218).
